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ABSTRACT
This paper tests whether providing information about the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) affects
EITC recipients' labor supply and earnings decisions. We conducted a randomized experiment with
43,000 EITC recipients at H&R Block in which tax preparers gave simple, personalized information
about the EITC schedule to half of their clients. We find no significant effects of information
provision on earnings in the subsequent year in the full sample. Further exploration uncovers evidence
of heterogeneous treatment effects on both self-employment income and wage earnings across the
1,461 tax professionals who assisted the clients involved in the experiment.We conclude that 
providing information about tax incentives through tax preparers does not systematically affect
earnings on average. However, tax preparers may be able to influence their client's earnings  
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A growing body of evidence suggests that individuals are not fully informed about the tax
and transfer policies relevant for economic choices (e.g., de Bartolome 1995, Duo et al. 2006,
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009, Bettinger et al. 2009, Jones 2010, Liebman and Luttmer,
2011). One natural hypothesis in light of this evidence is that policies that provide information
about incentives would enable individuals to make better choices. In this paper, we test whether
teaching individuals about the tax code aects labor supply choices using a randomized eld
experiment with Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) clients at H&R Block. The EITC is the
largest cash transfer program for low income families in the United States and it generates large
marginal subsidies or taxes on the earnings of recipients (Figure 1). Survey evidence shows
that the marginal incentive structure of the EITC is not well understood by eligible tax lers.
Most low-income families have heard about the EITC and know that working is associated with
getting a tax refund check when they le their taxes. But very few recipients know whether
working more would increase or reduce their EITC amount (Liebman 1998, Romich and Weisner
2002), perhaps because of the program's complexity. The lack of information could potentially
explain why the EITC induces small responses along the intensive margin (hours worked and
earnings), despite increasing substantially labor force participation (Hotz and Scholz 2003).
We evaluate the impacts of information provision using a randomized experiment that pro-
vided information about the EITC to eligible tax lers and tracked the eect of this interven-
tion on their subsequent earnings. The experiment was implemented at 119 H&R Block tax
preparation oces in the Chicago metro area in 2007. The experimental population comprised
approximately 43,000 tax lers who (a) received EITC payments at one of the 119 H&R Block
oces when ling taxes in 2007 and (b) had one or more dependents. Half of these clients were
randomly selected to receive a two minute explanation about how the EITC works from their
\tax professional," the H&R Block employee assisting them with their tax returns. Tax profes-
sionals were trained to use three tools to explain the EITC to their clients: a verbal description,
a graph showing the shape of the EITC as a function of earnings, and a table listing the key
EITC parameters. Each client was also given tailored advice emphasizing the implications of
his marginal incentives conditional on his location in the EITC schedule. For example, clients
in the phase-in region were told, \It pays to work more!"
We view our treatment as changing perceptions of marginal incentives around the tax ler's
1current location. Survey evidence indicates that most EITC recipients know the size of their
current EITC refund, but do not understand the extent to which the EITC varies with their
earnings. If the information treatment updates perceptions toward the true EITC schedule
and informed tax lers are responsive along the intensive margin, tax lers should change their
behavior to increase their EITC refunds. Such behavioral responses should generate a more
concentrated earnings distribution around the peak of the EITC schedule.
We analyze the eects of the intervention using data from tax returns led in 2007 (\year
1") and 2008 (\year 2"). 72% of the clients in the treatment and control groups returned to
H&R Block to le their taxes in the post-treatment year, allowing us to conduct a panel study
of the eects of the information treatment on earnings. We begin with a simple analysis of
treatment eects in the full sample. We nd weak evidence (p = 0:1) that treated clients have
larger increases in EITC amounts from year 1 to year 2 relative to control clients. The eect is
more pronounced for those with self-employment income in base year (about 11% of the sample)
although this eect is imprecisely estimated and still only marginally signicant (p = 0:1). The
information treatment thus had at best a marginal eect on wage earnings behavior overall. We
do not nd signicant eects when we cut the sample by whether the client was in the phase-in,
phase-out, or plateau in the base year. Based on this analysis, we conclude that providing
information about the tax code does not have signicant impacts on labor supply behavior on
average.
Next, we analyze heterogeneity of treatment eects across the 1,461 tax professionals who
implemented this experiment. Many tax professionals felt that it was in their clients' best
interest to work and earn more irrespective of the EITC's incentive eects and might have
framed the phase-out message as an encouragement to work more because the loss in EITC
benets is relatively small.1 We rst document that there is signicant (p < 0:01) heterogeneity
across tax professionals in mean treatment eects on EITC amounts using a non-parametric F
test. To characterize the nature of the heterogeneity, we follow the methodology of Duo et
al. (2006). We divide tax professionals into two groups that we label \complying" and \non-
complying." To construct these groups, we rst dene a simple measure of the concentration
of the earnings distribution in year 2 { the fraction of returning clients with \middle" incomes
1During focus groups prior to the experiment, several tax professionals argued that clients should always be
encouraged to work more because, \you lose $2 of EITC benets for every $10 you earn, but come out ahead by
$8 and possibly become eligible for other credits, so it still pays to work."
2(between $7,000 and $15,400).2 For each tax ler i, we dene his tax professional as a \complier"
if she has a higher fraction of other clients (excluding client i) with middle income in the
treatment group than the control group. Intuitively, from the perspective of client i, complying
tax professionals are those who increase the concentration of the earnings distribution for other
clients. Critically, because we exclude client i when dening his tax professional's compliance,
there is no correlation between client i's outcome and his tax professional's compliance under
the null hypothesis that all tax professionals have zero treatment eects.
For clients of complying tax professionals, the information treatment increases EITC amounts
signicantly by $58 on average (p < 0:01), or about 3%. The treatment eects are larger for the
self-employed, likely due to greater exibility and reporting eects, as there is no third-party
reporting of self-employment income. We also nd a signicant increase in the concentration
of the distribution of wage earnings suggesting that the information intervention induced \real"
changes in labor supply behavior for clients treated by complying tax professionals. For clients of
non-complying tax professionals, the information treatment does not lead to signicant changes
in EITC amounts. However, non-complying tax professionals increase their treated client's
incomes by $250 (1.5%) on average (p < 0:05). Based on our discussions with tax professionals,
we speculate that non-compliers may have used the information to simply encourage clients to
aim for a high level of earnings rather than maximize their EITC refunds. The heterogeneity
in impacts across tax preparers suggests that labor supply behavior may be inuenced not just
by information but also by the advice that tax professionals provide when helping to explain
the incentives.
We conclude that information provision is not a very eective tool for changing earnings
behavior on average, though it might have eects in some subgroups when coupled with advice
from tax professionals. The tailored provision of information by expert tax professionals is
likely to be a stronger treatment than more easily scalable interventions such as mailings of
informational brochures. Hence, our study suggests that policies which disseminate information
are not by themselves likely to change earnings behavior signicantly.3 This lesson is consistent
2The upper threshold of $15,400 is the start of the EITC phase-out range; the lower threshold of $7000 is
chosen to divide the remaining interval into two equal-sized bins. As we describe in the appendix, alternative
measures of the concentration of the earnings distribution yield similar results.
3An alternative interpretation of our ndings is wage earners may be unable to change their earnings in
response to information. However, we nd that earnings vary substantially across years within households
in our sample, partly because EITC claimants tend to hold many temporary jobs for short periods of time.
Hence, we believe that adjustment frictions are unlikely to fully explain the lack of response to our information
3with recent evidence that information treatments have modest eects in other settings, such
as college enrollment (Bettinger et al. 2009) or retirement savings (Beshears et al. 2011).
While our results suggest that knowledge about the tax code cannot be easily manipulated with
simple information treatments, the spread of knowledge through peer networks or other sources
that aect knowledge in more persistent ways could have larger impacts on behavior (Chetty,
Friedman, and Saez 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on the
EITC and the literature on the eects of the program. Section 3 describes the experimental
design and data. The main results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents results on het-
erogeneity across tax professionals. Section 6 concludes. Robustness checks and documentation
of the materials used in the experiment are provided in the online appendix.
2 Background on the EITC
2.1 Program Structure
The EITC is a refundable tax credit administered through the income tax system. In 2009,
the most recent year for which statistics are available, 25.9 million tax lers received a total of
$57.7 billion in EITC payments (Internal Revenue Service 2011, Table 2.5). Eligibility for the
EITC depends on earnings { dened as wage and salary income and self-employment income {
and the number of qualifying children. Qualifying dependents for EITC purposes are relatives
who are under age 19 (24 for full time students) or permanently disabled, and reside with the
tax ler for at least half the year.4
Figure 1A displays the EITC amount as a function of earnings for single and joint tax lers
with zero, one, or two or more qualifying dependents in 2007, the year our experiment was
conducted. EITC amounts increase substantially with the number of dependents, but the shape
of the schedule as a function of earnings is the same in all three cases. EITC amounts rst
increase linearly with earnings, then plateau over a short income range, and are then reduced
linearly and eventually phased out completely. Since the EITC amounts for tax lers with no
children dependents are very small (maximum of $428), we excluded them from our experiment,
intervention, though they could certaintly have attenuated its eects.
4Only one tax ler can claim an eligible child; for example, in the case of non-married parents, only one
parent can claim the child.
4focusing only on tax lers with one or more children.
In the phase-in region, the subsidy rate is 34 percent for taxpayers with one child and 40
percent for taxpayers with two or more children. In the plateau (or peak) region, the EITC
is constant and equal to a maximum value of $2,853 and $4,716 for tax lers with 1 and 2+
children, respectively. In the phase-out region, the EITC amount decreases at a rate of 15.98%
for lers with 1 child, and 21.06% for those with 2+ children. The EITC is entirely phased-out at
earnings equal to $33,241 and $37,783 for single lers with 1 and 2+ children, respectively.5 See
IRS Publication 596 (Internal Revenue Service 2007) for complete details on program eligibility
and rules as of 2007.
2.2 Claiming the EITC: Administrative Procedures
To claim the EITC, families le an income tax return that includes an EITC schedule between
January 1 and April 15 of the following calendar year. The EITC is received in a single payment
as part of the tax refund shortly after ling.6
According to the 2004 public use microdata on tax returns, 74% of families with children
receiving the EITC use paid tax preparers to le their returns. The largest company in the
market for paid tax preparation in the United States is H&R Block. H&R Block has about
13,000 oces located throughout the United States and employs over 100,000 tax professionals
during the tax ling season. H&R Block currently prepares about 12% of individual tax returns
in the U.S. A substantial fraction of these returns are for EITC claimants, as over half of H&R
Block's individual clients have an adjusted gross income (AGI) below $35,000.
To le their tax returns, clients come to an H&R Block oce with relevant documents such as
their W-2 wage income forms. The client sits with a \tax professional" { the term used to refer
to H&R Block employees who prepare tax returns { in front of a computer running the H&R
Block Tax Preparation Software (TPS). TPS consists of a series of screens corresponding to the
various steps in tax return preparation. At each screen, the tax professional asks questions or
inputs information from the forms brought in by the client. The tax preparation process takes
about 30 to 45 minutes to complete for a typical EITC client.
5For those who are married and le jointly, the plateau and phase-out regions of the EITC are extended by
$2,000 in 2007.
6There is an option to receive the EITC in advance during the year through the paycheck, but take-up of
this option is extremely low (less than 2%). See Government Accountability Oce (2007) and Jones (2010).
52.3 Existing Evidence and Perceptions of EITC
There is a large empirical literature estimating the eects of the EITC on labor supply and
earnings. Hotz and Scholz (2003) and Eissa and Hoynes (2006) provide comprehensive surveys.
A number of studies have found strong evidence that the EITC increases labor force participation
{ the extensive margin response.7 However, there is little evidence that the EITC leads to a
change in labor supply for those already in the labor market { the intensive margin. Most
studies nd no eects of the EITC on hours of work (see e.g., Meyer and Rosenbaum 1999 and
Rothstein 2010). Using tax return data, Saez (2010) nds clear evidence of bunching of EITC
recipients at the rst kink of the EITC schedule { where the phase-in ends and the plateau starts
{ for recipients reporting self-employment income. However, there is no bunching for recipients
who do not report any self-employment income, who account for 89% of the individuals in our
dataset.
The contrast between the strong responses along the extensive margin and small or zero
responses along the intensive margin could be explained by a lack of information about the
structure of the EITC (Liebman 1998, Hotz and Scholz 2003, p. 182). To respond along the
extensive margin, families only need to know that working is associated with a large tax refund.
In contrast, responding along the intensive margin requires knowledge about the non-linear
marginal incentives created by the three ranges of the EITC displayed in Figure 1A. Surveys of
low income families and in-depth interviews of EITC claimants show that there is widespread
knowledge about the EITC's existence, but little knowledge about the structure of the EITC
(Ross Phillips 2001, Olson and Davis 1994, Romich and Weisner 2002, Smeeding, Ross Phillips,
and O'Connor 2002, Maag 2005). These interviews indicate that 60-90% of low income families
have heard about the EITC and know that it is a tax refund for working. However, less than
5% of these families know about the non-linear pyramid shape of the EITC as a function of
earnings and the location of the kink points.8
The lack of knowledge about the EITC's structure is striking given that the program param-
7See e.g., Eissa and Liebman (1996), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001). Eissa and Hoynes (2004) present
complementary evidence of extensive-margin responses in the opposite direction: the labor force participation
rate of married women in the phase-out region of the schedule fell slightly when the EITC was expanded. We
expect that this extensive-margin response has a small impact on our results because 91% of the tax lers in
our sample are single.
8Among the 42 families interviewed by Romich and Weisner (2002), 90% had heard of the EITC, but only
two families knew that they needed to earn a certain amount to maximize their credit. One of those two families
aimed at reporting self employment earnings in order to maximize the credit (p. 378).
6eters have been quite stable since 1996. However, it is not surprising in view of the information
currently available about the program. To our knowledge, prior to our experiment, the graphi-
cal depiction of the EITC schedule shown in Figure 1A could only be found in academic papers.
Ocial Internal Revenue Service publications provide tables that show exact EITC amounts as
a function of income and other characteristics, but do not summarize the EITC phase-in, peak,
and phase-out structure in a transparent way. For legal reasons, the IRS only distributes com-
prehensive documents that cover all possible contingencies, making it impossible to highlight
the features of the tax code most relevant for a given taxpayer.9 In addition, none of the ex-
isting commercial tax preparation software describes the EITC structure or marginal incentives
explicitly.
We conclude from the existing literature that most EITC recipients know the value of their
current EITC refund amount, but do not think about the slope of the EITC schedule when
making marginal earnings decisions. For such EITC recipients, the local slope created by the
EITC is therefore irrelevant in their labor supply decision. It is natural to assume that EITC
recipients who do take into account the EITC when choosing their labor supply have unbiased
beliefs about the relevant slope. In this case, the average EITC recipient's perception of the
EITC schedule is atter than the actual schedule. More precisely, let EITCp(z) denote the
individual's perceived EITC refund at an earnings level of z and EITC(z) the actual EITC
refund at that level of earnings. Let sp(z) denote the perceived local slope of the EITC
schedule and s(z) the actual slope. The existing survey evidence suggests that the representative
individual with initial earnings z0 perceives the relationship between earnings z and his EITC
refund to be
EITC
p(z) = EITC(z0) + (1 + s
p(z))(z   z0) (1)
where jsp(z)j < js(z)j. Figure 1B illustrates the perceived budget constraint in (1) for two tax
lers, one in the phase-in range and one in the phase-out range. Such misperceptions about
marginal incentives motivate our question of whether improving knowledge (updating sp(z))
could amplify the impacts of the EITC on intensive-margin labor supply.10
9For example, the ocial IRS publication on the EITC intended for the public (Internal Revenue Service,
2007, Publication 596) is 57 pages long and never explicitly mentions the slope parameters of the credit. The
publication simply states the EITC amounts in the form of a 7 page table that has 4,770 entries.
10There is similar evidence that people are not fully informed about many other aspects of income tax schedules.
See Fujii and Hawley (1988) for evidence from the United States, Brown (1968) for the United Kingdom, Bises
(1990) for Italy, and Brannas and Karlsson (1996) for Sweden.
73 Experimental Design
We implemented the information-provision experiment in 119 H&R Block oces in the Chicago
metropolitan area during the 2007 tax ling season (January 1 to April 15). Clients at these
oces who received an EITC with at least one eligible child were randomly assigned into the
treatment or control group. Assignment was based on the last 2 digits of the Social Security
Number of the primary ler. The probability of treatment assignment was 50 percent. The
control group followed the standard tax preparation procedure using the TPS software described
above. In the standard preparation procedure, a screen noties the tax ler of his EITC amount
if he is eligible for the EITC. This screen does not explain the structure of the EITC.
The new EITC information materials delivered by tax professionals to clients in the treat-
ment group were developed in a series of steps. We began by interviewing 12 single mothers
with recent work experience in the welfare oce of San Francisco county in early October 2006.
All 12 single mothers had led tax returns in the past and almost all had heard about the
EITC, but none knew about or had seen the graphical depiction of how the EITC varies with
earnings. The interviewees found the graphical presentation of the EITC reasonably easy to
understand and felt that it made the key features of the EITC very salient. Furthermore, most
of the individuals recognized the value of this information for their work decisions and found
the take-home messages sensible.11
We rened the information materials in a focus group with 15 experienced H&R Block tax
professionals and local managers in the Chicago area in late October 2006. Finally, H&R Block's
internal sta and legal team edited and approved all the materials used in the experiment. The
process described below is the nal procedure that resulted from the collaborative eort between
the researchers and H&R Block. Note that in all ocial tax forms as well as in H&R Block
materials, the EITC is referred to as the EIC (Earned Income Credit). We follow this convention
in the information treatment materials described below.
11For example, one of the interviewees suggested that we visit her housing complex to distribute this informa-
tion more widely, because her neighbors and friends would nd it useful in making overtime and part-time work
decisions.
83.1 Information Treatment
For the treatment group, two special \EIC information" screens are displayed automatically in
TPS at the end of the tax preparation process.12 The rst screen prompts the tax professional
to begin the EIC explanation they were trained to provide and introduces the client to the
information outreach program. This introductory screen is shown in Appendix Exhibit I(a)
for the case of a single ler with two or more dependents, the case on which we focus below
for concreteness. The screen displays the EIC amount the tax ler is getting and describes
the goal of the outreach eort, namely to help the client understand how the EIC depends on
earnings. The second EIC information screen is displayed in Appendix Exhibit I(b) for a tax
ler in the increasing range of the EIC. This screen provides the key EIC information relevant
to the tax ler's case, which the tax professional uses to explain the program to the client.
The central element of the explanation procedure is an \EIC handout" paper form that the
tax professional lls out with the client and uses as a visual aid to explain the program. There
are four EIC handouts based on the tax ler's marital status and dependents: single vs. joint
ler and one vs. two or more dependents. Exhibit I shows the EIC handout for the case of
a single ler with two or more dependents. The tax professional uses the information on the
computer screen to ll in the blanks on the form in the following four steps.
First, the tax professional lls in the income that the client earned in 2006 and the corre-
sponding EIC amount the client is receiving. Second, the tax professional draws a dot on the
graph illustrating the client's location on the schedule. He then uses the graph to explain the
link between earnings and the EIC amount.
In the third step, the tax professional circles the range of the schedule that the client is in
{ increasing, peak, or decreasing { and provides some advice corresponding to that range. In
the increasing range, the take-home message is \Suppose you earn $10 an hour, then you are
really making $14 an hour. It pays to work more!" In the peak range, the message is \Your
earnings are maxing-out the EIC amount." In the decreasing range, the message is \If you earn
$10 more, your EIC is reduced by $2.10. Earning more reduces your EIC, but you may qualify
for additional tax credits."
12This screen appears after all the client's tax information has been entered and the tax refund and liability
have been calculated. We show below that there is no dierence in base year earnings across control and
treatments groups, implying that treated tax lers did not go back and change their reported earnings in the
base year after getting the EIC information.
9The decreasing range message deliberately downplays the work disincentive created by the
EITC in the phaseout region. The advice took this form because many managers and tax
professionals at H&R Block felt strongly that it was in the best interest of tax lers to work and
earn more. Indeed, many tax professionals pitched the message verbally as \You lose $2 of your
EIC credit when you earn $10 more, but you still come out ahead by $8 and potentially become
eligible for other credits, so working more pays o."13 The fact that some tax professionals
advised clients to aim for a high level of earnings { irrespective of the EITC's eect on incentives
{ appears to have important eects on the results, as we will see below.
In the fourth step, the tax professional circles the relevant range in the table which displays
the exact parameters for the EITC. This table provides an alternative method of showing
exactly how much the client can change his earnings before crossing the threshold for the next
range. Tax professionals were trained to spend the most time on whichever of the three methods
the client appeared to understand best { the verbal, graphical, or tabular descriptions.
After this information explanation is provided and the tax return process is completed, TPS
automatically prints an \EIC printout" page that reproduces the information lled out in the
handout. Appendix Exhibit II displays an example of the EIC printout. This page is printed
at the same time as the tax return and inserted at the top of the packet given to the client to
take home. The client is reminded by the tax professional that this information may prove
useful when making earnings-related decisions later in the year. The purpose of the printout
is to present the EITC information in a clean, accurate format. The temporary handout used
to explain the program is kept by the tax professional.
Finally, to reinforce the treatment, H&R Block sent a letter summarizing the EITC informa-
tion to all treatment-eligible clients in August 2007. Appendix Exhibit III displays an example
of this letter.
As with most provisions of the tax code, EITC ranges are mechanically indexed for ination
and therefore dier slightly across the base year and subsequent year. Since our goal was to
inform tax lers about the EITC parameters relevant for their subsequent labor supply decisions,
the table and graph display the EITC parameters for 2007 earnings and the corresponding EITC
that would be received when ling in 2008 (the post-treatment year). The classication of tax
13In some cases, other credits such as the non-refundable portion of the child tax credit do indeed increase
with earnings in the EITC phaseout range, mitigating the implicit tax on work. We chose not to explain all
aspects of the tax system in our information handout in the interest of simplicity.
10lers into the 3 groups { increasing, peak, and decreasing { was also based on the 2007 EITC
parameters. As a result, a tax ler who was at the very beginning of the peak range would
actually be presented with the increasing scenario that would apply were he to have the same
nominal income in 2007. Similarly, a tax ler at the very beginning of the decreasing range
would be presented with the peak scenario. Since the IRS ination rate applied from tax year
2006 to 2007 was relatively small (3.9%), only 4% of taxpayers were located at a point where
their current range diered from their predicted range for the following year. Note that the
phase-in and phase-out rates were unchanged across the years.
3.2 Tax Professional Behavior
The eects of the experiment depend critically on the knowledge and behavior of the tax pro-
fessionals. There were 1,461 tax professionals involved in the experiment, each of whom had 29
clients in our sample on average (including treatment and control). We trained approximately
100 \oce leaders" (senior tax professionals) in November 2006 ourselves, who then trained
the rest of the tax professionals during December 2006. The training described the general
goal of the outreach eort, why the experimental design required giving information to only
half the clients, and explained the changes to the TPS system that would be introduced. A
series of case studies with hypothetical clients were used to illustrate various scenarios and how
standardized explanations should be provided in the four steps.14 Field observations in January
2007 conrmed that the EIC information screens and printouts were working as planned and
that tax professionals were implementing the experiment as trained.
In pilot sessions, we found that a minimum time of two minutes was required for a coherent
explanation of the EITC. To give tax professionals an incentive to administer the information
treatment carefully to eligible clients, each tax professional was oered $5 for each eligible
client with whom they spent at least two minutes on the EIC information screens (with time
tracked by the software). If the tax professional attempted to exit the information screens
before two minutes elapsed, the TPS system displayed a warning, \Does your client understand
the explanation of how the EIC impacts their tax return?" The system then allowed the tax
professional to go back and continue his explanation, resuming the two minute clock. Tax
professionals who spent less than two minutes on the information screens did not receive any
14The powerpoint slides and case studies used for training are available from the authors upon request.
11compensation for that client. Figure 2 displays a histogram of seconds spent by tax professionals
on the EITC screens and shows that there is clear spike at 120 seconds, implying that most tax
professionals understood and responded to the compensation structure. The average time spent
on the information screens conditional on reaching 120 seconds is 3.5 minutes.
Overall, 73% of tax lers whom we intended to treat were treated for at least two minutes.
A substantial fraction of the variance in compliance rates is explained by oce xed eects,
presumably due to variations in training. Most oces had very high compliance. However,
one large oce had a two-minute treatment rate of 6%, 11 percentage points below the next
lowest oce. We believe this exceptionally low treatment rate arose from a failure to hold the
planned training sessions. Since the treatment was eectively not implemented at this oce,
we exclude it from the analysis below.15
The decision to oer a 2+ minute EITC explanation to eligible clients may have depended on
the client's interest in the information. Since a client's interest is not random, we follow stan-
dard practice in the experimental literature and estimate \intent-to-treat" eects { comparing
outcomes of those eligible and ineligible to receive the information explanation.
To supplement the statistics on compliance rates, we directly assessed the tax professionals'
reactions to the experiment using a survey of the tax professionals at the end of the tax season.
See Appendix Exhibit IV for the survey instrument. To obtain candid responses, the surveys
identied oces but not individual tax professionals within those oces. 78% of the 119 oces
sent back completed surveys, yielding a total of 785 survey responses. 88% of the tax pro-
fessionals who responded to the survey thought that the EITC information should be oered
again in the future. 81% of surveyed tax professionals thought that the EITC experiment pilot
helped their own understanding of how the EITC credit works. This shows that our outreach
eort did provide new information about the structure of the EITC beyond what is normally
provided in the tax preparation procedure at H&R Block. As an important caveat, note that
tax professionals who went through our training process may have oered better explanations
on the EITC to tax lers in the control group as well. To minimize such contamination eects,
we emphasized repeatedly in training that it was critical not to give any extra information to
the clients who were not selected for treatment for the purpose of the study. Any remaining
contamination eects would attenuate our treatment eect estimates. Nevertheless, it is im-
15Including the oce does not change our qualitative results but, unsurprisingly, slightly reduces the magnitude
and precision of the estimates.
12portant to recognize that the treatment is only the extra advice that trained professionals were
willing to provide to treated clients using the guidance from TPS screens.16
When asked about client interest, 37% of tax professionals said that \most" (>75%) of their
clients were interested in the information explanation. 38% of the tax professionals said that
\many" (25 to 75%) clients were interested, while 25% of tax professionals felt that few (<25%)
of their clients were interested. We conclude from these surveys that most tax professionals
were enthusiastic about the experiment and thought it was a valuable service for their clients,
suggesting that the information treatment was implemented satisfactorily.
3.3 Hypothesis
The hypothesis we seek to test is that the provision of information and advice by tax profes-
sionals induces clients to change their earnings behavior. More specically, tax professionals
who implement our information treatment as intended should update their clients' perceptions
toward the true EITC schedule, shifting sp toward s in equation (1).17 This change in percep-
tions of marginal incentives rotates the perceived budget set as shown in Figure 1B, generating
substitution eects but no income eects. Such substitution eects should increase earnings
for tax lers who would have been in the phase-in range absent the treatment, leave earnings
unchanged for those in the peak, and decrease earnings for tax lers in the phase-out. Hence, in
a neoclassical labor supply model, the information provided in the experiment should increase
EITC refunds.
It is important to note that we provide information only about the EITC. In practice,
other credits such as the Child Tax Credit, or the State and Federal income taxes also aect
the budget set. Hence, our treatment provides only partial information about the budget set.
If individuals react to our information as if it were describing their exact budget set, their
decisions might not increase their welfare.18 Note that if individuals are unable to understand
or act upon the information provided in the treatment, then our basic theoretical framework
16Unfortunately, we do not have access to data outside of the experimental oces to test whether control
clients in experimental oces responded to the experiment as well.
17A key limitation of the present study is that we can only speculate about how our treatment changed baseline
perceptions because we were unable to collect data on prior beliefs. As a result, we are only able to test the
broad null hypothesis that information and advice do not aect behavior. Testing sharper hypotheses about
the link between changes in priors and changes in behavior would be a valuable direction for future work.
18We opted to focus on explaining the EITC because explaining the full tax schedule would have been consid-
erably more complicated, increasing the risk that individuals would not have understood our explanation.
13predicts a zero marginal response. More generally, imperfect understanding will attenuate the
experimental eects toward zero.
4 Results
Our analysis of the experimental results is based on anonymous statistical compilations prepared
by H&R Block in accordance with applicable laws. These compilations were constructed from
data extracted from tax returns led in 2007 and 2008 and from supplemental information
collected by H&R Block during the implementation of the experiment in 2007.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups. Columns (1)-(3)
focus on the full sample while columns (4)-(6) focus on the sub-sample of clients who returned to
H&R Block in year 2 and for whom we have data on outcomes of the intervention.19 Columns
(1)-(3) show that the means of all of the base year variables are similar in the treatment and
control groups. None of the dierences are signicant at the 5 percent level, conrming that
randomization was successful. The mean income in the base year (year 1) in the full sample
is $16,600. Income is the sum of wage earnings and self-employment income. Average wage
earnings are $15,900. Average self-employment income is $700, and 11% of tax lers report
positive self-employment income.20 The mean EITC amount in the base year is $2,470. About
59% of the claimants have two or more dependents in the base year.
To examine distributional outcomes, throughout the paper we divide the income distribution
into three bins: low incomes (below $7000), middle incomes ($7000 to $15,400), and high incomes
(above $15,400). The upper threshold of $15,400 is the start of the EITC phase-out range for
single earners; the lower threshold of $7000 is chosen to divide the remaining interval into two
approximately equal-sized bins. By this classication, 14% of the sample is \low income", 34%
is \middle income", and 51% is \high income."
The bottom row of Table 1 shows the fraction of clients who returned to H&R Block in year
2. The average return rate is around 72%. The return rate is 0.85% lower in the treatment
19Unfortunately, we are unable to obtain tax returns data for clients who did not return to H&R Block.
20More precisely, positive self-employment income was measured as having positive self-employment taxes. No
self-employment taxes are due if self-employment income is below $400. 11% of tax lers have self-employment
income above $400.
14group, a small but marginally signicant dierence. We explore the pattern of return rates
further in Figure 3, which plots mean return rates by $1,000 base-year earnings bins in the
treatment and control groups. The average return rates track each other very closely, showing
that there are no systematic patterns of dierential attrition by base year income. In addition,
as shown in columns (4)-(6) of Table 1, there are no signicant dierences between the treatment
and control groups in the base-year variables for the subsample of clients who return. In view
of this evidence, we believe that the comparisons between the treatment and control groups
which follow are unlikely to be contaminated by selective attrition.
4.2 Full Sample Results
We begin our empirical analysis by comparing changes in EITC amounts (from year 1 to year
2) in the treatment and control groups. A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for
dierences in the empirical distributions of changes in EITC amounts shows only a marginally
signicant dierence between the treatment and control group (p = 0:074), as shown in Ap-
pendix Table A1. Figure 4 plots the density of post-treatment income using a kernel estimator
with an Epanechnikov density function and constant bandwidth. The dashed line is for clients
in the control group and the solid line is for clients in the treatment group. Panel A considers
clients with 1 dependent and Panel B those with 2+ dependents. The vertical lines mark the
cutos for the phase-in and phase-out regions for each case. Both panels show no discernible
eect of the treatment on the earnings density distribution in year 2 conrming the results from
the KS test that the treatment does not have a large eect on EITC amounts.
Next, we estimate treatment eects using OLS regressions of the form
yi =  + treati + Xi + "i; (2)
where yi is an outcome (typically a change from year 1 to year 2), treati is dened as an indicator
for being eligible for the treatment, and Xi is a vector of year 1 covariates. The coecient of
interest, , can be interpreted as an intent-to-treat estimate. Estimates of  are presented in
Table 2. The columns of Table 2 consider dierent outcomes or sets of covariates, while the
rows consider dierent subsamples. Hence, each coecient listed in the table is from a separate
regression. We report standard errors clustered by tax professional in parentheses as well as
the number of observations below the coecient.
15The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the dierence between the client's EITC
amount in the post-treatment and pre-treatment years. Columns 3 and 4 consider the change
in earnings from year 1 to year 2. In columns 2 and 4, we include the following vector of
base year covariates (X): earnings, earnings squared, wage earnings, indicator for married ling
jointly, and number of children (1 vs. 2 or more).
Row 1 of Table 2 shows treatment eect estimates for the full sample. Consistent with
the non-parametric KS test and graphical evidence presented above, we do not detect robust
dierences in EITC amounts or earnings distribution across the treatment and control groups.
Most of the coecients are small and statistically insignicant. There is weak evidence of a
treatment eect on the change in EITC amounts ($24 higher on average in the treatment group)
but the eect is only marginally signicant (p < 0:1).
4.3 Heterogeneity Across Subgroups of Individuals
Rows (2)-(4) of Table 2 divide the sample into subgroups based on whether the ler's income was
in the phase-in, plateau, and phase-out region in the base year. Recall from the experimental
design that the take-home message varied based on this EITC range (see Exhibit I). We do not
nd any signicant eects of the information treatments within any of these subgroups.
Next, we explore heterogeneity in treatment eect by self-employment status. The self-
employed are able to manipulate their income more easily than wage earners, and thus might
exhibit more of a response. As in Table 1, the self-employed are dened as the subsample of tax
lers with positive self-employment income in the base year. Note that these tax lers may also
have additional wage earnings beyond their self-employment income. Wage earners are dened
as tax lers who do not have positive self-employment income in base year.
Figure 5 shows the eect of the treatment on the distribution of year 2 earnings for self-
employed clients. Panel A is for clients with 1 dependent and Panel B is for those with
2+ dependents. The control group exhibits clear bunching at the rst kink point of the
EITC schedule, the lowest earnings level at which one obtains the maximum refund.21 This
is consistent with the nding of Saez (2010), who documents bunching at the rst kink point
among EITC recipients with self-employment income in IRS public use micro-data les. The
degree of bunching is slightly amplied in the treatment group, suggesting that the information
21Because individuals pay payroll and other taxes on income, the rst kink point of the EITC schedule
maximizes the size of their net refund from the government.
16may have induced some self-employed tax lers to target the refund-maximizing peak more
actively following the information treatment.22
Rows (5) and (6) of Table 2 compare the impacts of the treatment on EITC amounts and
earnings for the self-employed and wage earners. In row (5), the treatment eect on the change
in EITC amounts is much larger than in the full sample ($72.6 instead of $24), consistent with
the view that the self-employed were more responsive to the treatment. However, the eect is
imprecisely estimated and remains only marginally signicant (p < 0:1) due to the much smaller
sample size. As shown in row (6), there is no signicant eect on the EITC for wage earners.
5 Heterogeneity Across Tax Professionals
We expected that there might be heterogeneity in treatment eects across the 1,461 tax profes-
sionals involved in the experiment because of variation in training and willingness to convey the
take-home messages we proposed. Such heterogeneity across tax professionals could potentially
be masked in the full sample. We begin by implementing an F test for such treatment eect
heterogeneity across tax professionals. Let i = 1;:::;N index clients and p = 1;:::;P index tax
professionals. Let EITCi denote the change in the EITC amount (from year 1 to year 2) for
client i. Let tpi;p denote an indicator variable for whether client i is served by tax professional p
and treati denote an indicator for whether the client is in the treatment group. We implement







ptreati  tpi;p + "i:
In this specication, p is tax professional p's treatment eect.23 The null hypothesis that
p = 0 for all p is rejected with p = 0:0083, implying that some tax professionals generate
signicant dierences in EITC amounts between their treatment and control clients. The
hypothesis of constant treatment eects (p = p0 for all p;p0) is rejected with p = 0:0088,
showing the importance of heterogeneity across tax professionals.
The remainder of this section characterizes the magnitudes and patterns of heterogeneity in
treatment eects. We begin by developing a method of identifying \complying" tax professionals
22For clients with self-employment income in base year, the treatment increases the probability of reporting
earnings in the middle income range signicantly in year 2 by 3.93 (s.e. 1.57) percentage points.
23Note that treati is randomized within each tax professional's client group because treatment was randomized
at the individual client level.
17who implemented the treatment as planned and thereby induced changes in behavior as we
hypothesized, namely increasing the concentration of earnings and EITC amounts. Note that
the term \complier" simply refers to compliance with our ex-ante intentions for the experiment.
It should not be interpreted as a normative judgment about a tax professional, nor confused
with the terminology used in the local average treatment eect literature in econometrics.
5.1 Denition of Compliers
Because we do not observe how tax professionals explained the information to clients, we use
an indirect outcome-based method to identify \complying" tax professionals. For each tax ler
i, we dene his tax professional as a complier if the tax professional has a higher fraction of
other clients (excluding client i) with middle income in the treatment group than the control
group. Intuitively, from the perspective of a given client i, his tax professional complies with
the intention of the experiment if the tax professional increases the concentration of the earnings
distribution for her other clients. We dene the remaining clients as having \non-complying"
tax professionals. We use such an outcome based denition for compliers because we unfor-
tunately do not have any information on tax professionals characteristics (such as experience,
ability, or views on the EITC) that could have been used to cut the sample on pre-determined
characteristics.24
Three important points should be noted about this denition of compliance. First, because
client i himself is excluded when dening his tax professional's compliance, there is no correla-
tion between client i's outcome and his tax professional's compliance under the null hypothesis
that all tax professionals had zero treatment eects. A proof of this simple result is given in the
appendix A.1. To see the intuition, suppose a placebo treatment is randomly assigned to in-
dividuals, with no information provided to anyone. Dene \complying" and \non-complying"
tax professionals for each client as above. In this case, \complying" and \non-complying"
are eectively randomly assigned, as the placebo treatment has no impact on year 2 earnings.
Therefore, the sample of clients with a \complying" tax professional is simply a random sub-
sample of the initial sample. Within that subsample, individual treatment status remains
randomly assigned and hence should have no impact on outcomes. Hence, we would detect
24We also repeated the analysis below dening compliers vs. non-compliers at the oce level instead of the
tax professional level. We do not nd any signicant treatment heterogeneity with this oce-level denition,
suggesting that the heterogeneity in treatments occurs primarily at the tax professional level within oces rather
than across oces.
18zero treatment eects within the subsample of clients served by complying (or non-complying)
tax professionals if all tax professionals have zero treatment eects.25
Second, the denition of complying tax professionals is client-specic, as excluding a par-
ticular client might shift a given tax professional from the complying to the non-complying
category (and vice-versa). This creates a correlation in the error terms for clients served by
the same tax professional, as similar clients will tend to either all be excluded or included in
the \complying" group. We account for this problem by clustering all standard errors by tax
professional. To check this method of computing standard errors, we also calculate p values
for each regression we run using the following permutation method. We rst generate a placebo
treatment randomly (with 50% probability) and recompute complying vs. non-complying tax
professional status for each tax ler using this placebo treatment variable. We then estimate
the regression specication using the placebo treatment in lieu of the actual treatment to obtain
a placebo coecient. This process is repeated 2000 times to generate an empirical distribution
of placebo coecients. Finally, the permutation-based p value is computed using the location
of the actual treatment eect in the empirical cdf of the placebo coecients. We nd that
the dierence between the permutation-based p values and the p values from regressions with
clustered standard errors is less than 0:02 for every regression coecient reported below.26 This
placebo analysis also conrms that our method of identifying complying tax professionals does
not induce any articial correlations between treatment and outcomes.
Third, the denition of compliance above is one of many possible denitions. In our baseline
analysis, we dene compliance based on the middle income indicator because it provides a simple,
non-parametric way of measuring changes in the concentration of the earnings distribution. In
Appendix A.2, we show that similar results are obtained when compliance is dened based
on treatment eects on EITC amounts, which is eectively a smoother measure of changes in
the concentration of the income distribution (see Appendix Table A4). We also show that
controlling for base year characteristics of clients when classifying tax professionals and using
continuous measures of the degree of compliance instead of a binary classication yields similar
25As reported in appendix Table A2, the dierences between the means of the base year variables in the
treatment and control groups are insignicant within the subsamples of clients served by complying and non-
complying tax professionals, as in Table 1.
26Since there is no natural counterpart to clustering for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests in Table 2, we report
the permutation-based p values in that table.
19results (see Appendix Table A5).27
5.2 Treatment Eects
Graphical Evidence. Figure 6 plots the density of post-treatment income for clients with com-
plying tax professionals who have 1 dependent (Panel A) and 2+ dependents (Panel B). In both
panels, there is greater mass in the treated group near the rst kink point of the EITC schedule
than there is in the control group. Conversely, there are fewer treated clients in the phase-out
range. The increased concentration in the earnings distribution increases EITC amounts for
treated clients. The dierences between the treatment and control income distributions in Fig-
ure 6 are highly signicant. Using a KS test, the null hypothesis that there are no dierences
in EITC amounts between treated and control clients is rejected with p < 0:01 for complying
tax professionals, as shown in Column 1 of Appendix Table A1.
Figure 7 plots the density of post-treatment income for clients with non-complying tax
professionals. The earnings distribution for clients treated by non-compliers is shifted toward
the right, placing more clients in the phase-out range and thereby reducing their EITC refunds.28
Figures 6 and 7 help explain why we detect no treatment eects in the full sample: the com-
pliers and non-compliers shift the earnings distribution in opposite directions, generating little
change in the full sample. The complying tax professionals induce behavioral responses consis-
tent with the two specic hypotheses described in section 3.3. Non-complying tax professionals
did not generate a behavioral response consistent with EITC incentives, instead pushing more
of their clients into the phase-out range. One potential explanation for this response is that
the non-compliers are tax professionals who framed the EITC incentive eects as being small
relative to the benets of earning a higher income, which we anticipated might occur based on
feedback prior to the experiment.
Regression Estimates. To quantify the size of the behavioral responses, we estimate treatment
eects within the complier and non-complier subgroups using the OLS specication in (2). The
results are reported in Table 3. In all regressions, we control for base year variables as in Table
2 columns (2) and (4). As a reference, Row 1 of Table 3 rst presents the estimates pooling
27A more ambitious approach, left for future research, would be to adopt the variable treatment setting of
Angrist and Imbens (1995) with the additional diculty that treatment intensity is not observed.
28This shift in earnings distributions, and hence of the EITC amounts in the non-complying treatment group
relative to the control group is borne out by the KS tests reported in row 3 of appendix Table A1.
20compliers and non-compliers, replicating columns 3 and 4 in the rst row of Table 2.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the change in EITC amount, (2) reports the change in earnings,
(3) reports the change in EITC amount among the self-employed in base year, and (4) reports
the change in EITC amount among the pure wage earners in base year. Finally, column (5)
reports the change in EITC amounts computed exclusively using wage earnings (ignoring self-
employment income) again for the sample of pure wage earners in base year. This last outcome
detects eects on pure wage earnings. Consistent with our preceding results, none of the
estimates in row 1 for the full sample are signicantly dierent from zero.
Row 2 of Table 2 shows estimates for the subsample of clients served by complying tax
professionals. Column 1 shows that clients treated by complying tax professionals increase their
EITC amounts by $58 (s.e. 20.5) more than control group clients of the same tax professionals.
Column 2 shows that the treatment does not induce a signicant change in mean earnings from
year 1 to year 2. The nding is consistent with an increase in concentration rather than a shift
of the earnings distribution.
Row 3 considers the non-complying tax professionals. Clients given the information treat-
ment by these tax professionals experience a statistically insignicant reduction of $32 (column
1) in their EITC amounts relative to their peers in the control group. This is because non-
complying tax professionals shift clients away from the region of the EITC schedule where
refunds are maximized (Figure 7). Column 2 shows that the earnings of treated clients of
non-compliers rise by $247 (s.e. 120) more on average than control clients. These results are
consistent with the density plots in Figure 7: non-compliers shift the earnings distribution to
the right and increase the likelihood of high incomes. The mean of the coecients in rows 2
and 3 roughly corresponds to the coecients in row 1, explaining why we do not detect clear
treatment eects in the full sample.29
Finally, in rows 4 and 5, we compare the treatment eects for complying and non-complying
tax professionals to test whether the estimates reported in rows 2 and 3 are statistically distin-
guishable. We estimate a model analogous to (2) on the full sample, interacting all the variables
with an indicator for having a complying tax professional. Row 4 reports the coecient on the
interaction of the treatment and complier indicators, which is simply the dierence in the coef-
29Appendix Table A3 renes this analysis by EITC range in the base year. It shows that most of the dierential
eects we uncover for compliers and non-compliers come from clients who were in the phase-out region in the
base-year, consistent with the view that tax professionals explained the phase-out incentives dierently.
21cients reported in rows 3 and 4. Under the null hypothesis of zero treatment eects for all tax
professionals, this \dierence in dierence" estimate would be zero. Contrary to the null, all of
the coecients reported in row 4 are statistically signicant. Clients treated by complying tax
professionals experience a $90 larger increase in their EITC refund on average relative to clients
treated by non-complying tax professionals. Furthermore, clients treated by compliers have on
average $420 lower growth in earnings than clients treated by non-compliers. These results
highlight the substantial amount of treatment eect heterogeneity across tax professionals.
The heterogeneity in treatment eects that we have documented could come from two po-
tential sources. One natural interpretation { which is the one we have suggested thus far {
is that tax professionals implemented the information treatment in dierent ways, leading to
dierent outcomes. An alternative view is that the variation in treatment eects is not caused
by dierences in tax professionals' behavior but instead by variations in the set of clients that
dierent types of tax professionals served. Our experiment randomized the information treat-
ment within tax professional but did not randomize clients across tax professionals. In row 5
of Table 3, we explore the source of the treatment eect heterogeneity by adding interactions of
the vector of base year controls with the treatment dummy to the specications in row 4. In
this specication, the coecient on the interaction of the treatment and complier indicators can
be interpreted as the eect of having a complying tax professional, holding xed observable base
year characteristics. We nd that all coecients in row 5 are very similar to the corresponding
coecients in row 4, suggesting that the heterogeneity in treatment eects is not driven by
observable heterogeneity in client characteristics.30
Self-Employment Income vs. Wage Earnings Responses. Next, we explore the extent to which
the treatment eects documented above are driven by changes in self-employment income vs.
wage earnings. This distinction is important to determine whether the information treatment
changed labor supply or simply led to changes in reported income in order to maximize EITC
refunds.
30The heterogeneity in treatment eects could, however, be driven by unobservable heterogeneity in treatment
eects across clients. For instance, suppose clients sort across tax professionals in a way that is correlated
with their knowledge of the EITC. Then the heterogeneity in treatment eects across tax professionals could
be driven by heterogeneity in clients' knowledge. Complying tax professionals could be those who serve clients
with \at" priors as in Figure 1B, while non-complying tax professionals could be those whose clients think
that the phase-out rate is higher than it actually is. Note that such client heterogeneity explanations require
substantial sorting of clients purely on unobserved characteristics. While we cannot rule out such sorting, we
believe that the sharp dierences in treatment eects across complying and non-complying tax professionals are
more likely to be driven by the tax professionals themselves.
22In column (3) of Table 3, we examine the self-employment income response by focusing
on the subsample of tax lers with positive self-employment income in base year . Row 1
shows a marginally signicant eect on this sub-sample even without cutting the sample by tax
professional complying status as we documented row 5 of Table 2. Row 2 shows that complying
tax professionals increase their treated clients' EITC amounts by almost $130 relative to the
control group. This treatment eect for the self-employed is twice as large as those reported in
the full sample (row 2, column 1). In contrast, row 3 shows that non-complying tax professionals
induce no signicant treatment eects on their self-employed clients' EITC amounts or fraction
with middle income. Rows 4 and 5 corroborate the substantial dierences in year 2 outcomes
between clients treated by compliers and non-compliers, even after controlling for observed client
heterogeneity.
We next study the eect of the treatment on wage earnings. Column (4) of Table 3 considers
the sample of pure wage earners in year 1 and estimate the eect of EITC changes. Row (2)
shows that complying tax professional do increase EITC amounts by $49 (s.e. 21) in that
subsample. In contrast, non-complying tax professionals slightly reduce EITC amounts.
The increase in EITC refunds among clients of complying tax professionals could in principle
be due to self-employment responses on the extensive margin, i.e., treated wage earners who
start reporting self-employment income to increase their EITC refunds. However, we nd no
signicant increase in the likelihood to report self-employment income in this subsample. As an
alternative method to quantify the impact on wage earnings itself, we compute EITC amounts
based solely on wage earnings.31 We report such coecients in column (5) of Table 3, again for
the subsample of those with no self-employment income in base year. Row 1 shows that there is
no signicant dierence in wage-based EITC amounts between the treatment and control groups
in the full sample pooling compliers and non-compliers. Row 2 shows that clients treated by
complying tax professionals have a $55 increase in their wage-based EITC amounts relative to
control clients (p < 0:05). Non-complying tax professionals, in contrast, reduce their treated
clients' wage-based EITC amounts by $57 (p < 0:05). Finally, rows 4 and 5 conrm that
there are highly signicant (p < 0:01) dierences in year 2 outcomes between clients treated by
compliers and non-compliers, even after controlling for observed client heterogeneity.
31More precisely, we compute the EITC amount that the tax ler would have obtained if her self-employment
income were zero (and her wage income was left unchanged). For pure wage earners, actual EITC amounts and
wage based EITC amounts naturally coincide.
23Appendix Figures A1 and A2 show the counterpart of Figures 6 and 7 using wage earnings
instead of total earnings. Figure A1 shows that complying tax professionals increase the mass
of the wage earnings distribution around the rst kink point for treated clients. This increase
in mass is slightly smaller than the change in the distribution of total income shown in Figure
6, conrming that part of the treatment eect is driven by the self-employment margin. In
contrast, Figure A2 shows that clients given the information treatment by non-complying tax
professionals are more likely to have wage earnings that place them in the phase-out range.32
The nding that non-compliers increase wage earnings but induce no change in reported
self-employment income suggests that they did not explain how to maximize EITC refunds.
Conversely, the fact that compliers induce stronger responses in self-employment income { which
is easier to manipulate via reporting eects { than wage income (Internal Revenue Service, 1996,
Table 2, page 8) suggests that they emphasized the behaviors relevant for maximizing the EITC
refund.
6 Conclusion
This paper has reported the results of an experiment testing the eects of providing information
about the structure of the EITC on earnings decisions. We nd that the information treatment
did not induce signicant changes in earnings on average. We nd some evidence of hetero-
geneous responses to the information treatment across the H&R Block tax professionals who
implemented the experiment. Half of the tax professionals increase their treated clients' EITC
amounts and the concentration of their wage earnings distribution around the rst kink point
of the EITC schedule. The remaining tax professionals do not induce a signicant change in
EITC amounts, but increase their clients' probabilities of having high wage earnings that place
them in the phase-out range. We speculate that this heterogeneity in treatment eects arises
from the dierent ways in which tax professionals used the information to advise their clients.
The heterogeneous treatment eects we document are modest in absolute terms, but are
fairly large in comparison with intensive margin responses to other policies. Previous studies
suggest that the intensive margin elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate is
approximately 0.25 (e.g., Chetty 2012). Using this elasticity, a simple calibration exercise (see
32In column 2 of Appendix Table A1, we report the results of KS tests for a dierence between treatment and
control groups in the distribution of wage-based EITC amounts. These tests conrm that both complying and
non-complying tax professionals signicantly change their treated clients' distribution of wage earnings.
24Appendix A.3) shows that complying tax professionals generate the same labor supply response
along the intensive margin as a 33% expansion of the EITC. Non-complying tax professionals
increase earnings by an amount equivalent to the response to a 5 percentage point tax rate
cut. These ndings suggest that tax professionals can inuence their clients' earnings choices
signicantly, and that such advice may have more of an impact on behavior than the pure
information provided on the EITC handouts themselves. Unfortunately, we are unable to
characterize the mechanisms through which such advice aects behavior. The decentralized
implementation of our experiment makes it dicult to dene the \treatment" that was provided
by each of the tax professionals. In particular, we do not have measures of the informational
content, clarity, or salience of the treatment provided by each tax professional.33
We conclude that providing information about marginal income tax incentives does not have
systematic impacts on earnings in the short run. However, recent work by Chetty, Friedman,
and Saez (2012) suggests that local knowledge among peers does aect EITC claimants' aects
both self-employment and wage earnings signicantly. Chetty, Friedman, and Saez (2012)
show that the EITC has very dierent impacts on earnings behavior across neighborhoods in
the United States, and that these dierences are likely driven by variation in knowledge about
the shape of the EITC schedule. Together, these results suggest that knowledge may have to be
manipulated more organically and persistently { e.g. by changing peers' behavior { rather than
via one-time provision of information to inuence behavior. Investigating the process through
which knowledge about government policy diuses and understanding how it can be shaped by
policy would be a very valuable direction for future work.
33Bhargava and Manoli (2011) conduct a randomized experiment on EITC take-up that implements variation
along these dimensions, and shows that each of them matters signicantly.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income ($) 16,587 16,624 37.28 17,291 17,397 106.24
(74.52) (79.77) (82.35) (79.68) (84.62) (96.26)
Wage Earnings ($) 15,872 15,913 40.25 16,626 16,756 129.75
(92.76) (95.71) (93.40) (100.03) (98.36) (107.72)
EITC amount ($) 2,478 2,465 -13.04 2,533 2,508 -24.41
(10.88) (12.18) (12.27) (11.93) (13.19) (14.52)
Percent Self Employed 11.40% 11.18% -0.21% 10.52% 10.27% -0.25%
(0.47) (0.45) (0.32) (0.49) (0.45) (0.35)
Percent Low Income 14.30% 14.69% 0.39% 11.13% 11.62% 0.49%
(0.29) (0.31) (0.35) (0.28) (0.31) (0.38)
Percent Middle Income 34.28% 33.96% -0.32% 33.92% 33.14% -0.78%
(0.44) (0.47) (0.45) (0.46) (0.50) (0.53)
Percent Upper Income 51.41% 51.34% -0.07% 54.95% 55.24% 0.29%
(0.42) (0.46) (0.48) (0.46) (0.50) (0.57)
Percent Married 9.53% 9.40% -0.14% 10.20% 9.78% -0.42%
(0.32) (0.32) (0.28) (0.37) (0.36) (0.33)
Percent with 2 or more 59.29% 59.29% 0.00% 61.65% 61.86% 0.22%
dependents in Year 1 (0.37) (0.39) (0.48) (0.41) (0.44) (0.55)
Percent Return in Year 2 72.57% 71.72% -0.85% 100.00% 100.00% 0.00%
Percent with 2 or more (0.34) (0.37) (0.44)
Means of Base-Year Variables by Treatment Eligibility
Table 1
Notes: All variables are base year (year 1) values except last row. Standard errors clustered by tax
professional reported in parentheses. Income is defined as the sum of wage income and self-employment
income. Self employed is a binary variable defined as having positive self-employment income
(irrespective of other wage earnings). Low income is defined as income below $7,000; middle income is
defined as income between $7,000 and $15,400; and upper income is defined as income above $15,400.
Treatment group includes all tax filers we intended to treat. Columns (1) to (3) include the full sample in
base year while columns (4) to (6) include only those returning in year 2 (this is the sample of analysis).
A. Full Base Year Sample B. Year 2 Returning SampleDep. Var.: Δ EITC amount Δ EITC amount Δ Earnings Δ Earnings
with controls  with controls 
Sample (1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Full Sample 24.02 17.17 17.66 29.35
(14.77) (14.06) (84.27) (83.46)
30,303 30,303 30,303 30,303
(2) Year 1 in Phase-in 3.88 9.47 -259.23 -263.60
(31.68) (28.15) (150.15) (148.46)
7,442 7,442 7,442 7,442
(3) Year 1 in Plateau 10.39 10.23 151.65 167.11
(31.96) (31.33) (186.40) (181.29)
5,687 5,687 5,687 5,687
(4) Year 1 in Phase-out 30.63 22.72 76.91 111.34
(17.82) (17.34) (119.19) (118.51)
17,174 17,174 17,174 17,174
(5) Self-employed in year 1 72.60 66.10 97.45 80.63
(45.05) (43.21) (247.61) (242.65)
3,150 3,150 3,150 3,150
(6) Wage earner in year 1 18.54 11.02 7.96 24.99
(15.34) (14.74) (89.13) (87.38)
27,153 27,153 27,153 27,153
Table 2
Treatment Effects on EITC Amounts and Earnings 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by tax professional reported in parentheses; number of
observations is reported below the standard error. Each coefficient is from a separate
regression. Columns show treatment effects on various outcomes -- cols. 1-2: change in EITC
amount from year 1 to year 2; cols. 3-4: change in earnings from year 1 to year 2. Columns 2 and
4 include the following base year controls: earnings, earnings squared, wage earnings, married
filing jointly dummy, and number of qualifying children (1 vs. 2 or more). 
Row (1) reports coefficients on the treatment indicator from OLS regressions of the form shown in 
equation (2) in the text for the full sample of tax filers who returned in year 2. Row (2) limits the
sample to those with year 1 earnings in the EITC phase-in. Row (3) limits the sample to those
with year 1 earnings in the EITC plateau. Row (4) limits the sample to those with year 1 earnings
in the EITC phase-out. Row (5) limits the sample to those with positive self-employment income
in year 1. Row (6) limits the sample to wage earners in year 1 (defined as not having self-
employment income in year 1). Dep. Var.: Δ EITC amount Δ Earnings Δ EITC amount Δ EITC amount Δ Wage Based 
EITC amount
Sample All All Year 1 self-
employed
Year 1 pure 
wage earners
Year 1 pure 
wage earners
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Full Sample 17.17 29.35 66.10 11.02 3.72
(14.06) (83.46) (43.21) (14.74) (15.82)
30,303 30,303 3,150 27,153 27,153
(2) Complying Tax 58.05 -172.94 128.92 49.38 54.53
  Professionals (20.46) (123.66) (59.69) (21.48) (22.48)
15,395 15,395 1,630 13,765 13,765
(3) Non-Complying -32.28 247.26 -27.47 -32.90 -56.53
  Tax Professionals (20.40) (119.87) (64.87) (21.21) (22.76)
14,534 14,534 1,495 13,039 13,039
(4) Compliers vs Non- 90.33 -420.20 156.40 82.29 111.06
  Compliers: (2) - (3) (30.20) (180.20) (89.25) (31.34) (32.97)
29,929 29,929 3,125 26,804 26,804
(5) Compliers vs Non- 89.78 -421.74 161.44 81.69 111.01
  Compliers with controls (30.27) (180.68) (89.22) (31.35) (33.00)
  for Heterogeneity 29,929 29,929 3,125 26,804 26,804
The coefficient on the interaction is reported. We also include interactions of the base year control variables
with the complying tax professional indicator. Row (5) reports the difference in treatment effects between
complying and non-complying tax professionals controlling for heterogeneity in treatment effects by client
observables. This specification adds interactions of the base year controls with the treatment indicator to the
specifications in row (4).  The coefficient on the treatment x complying tax professional interaction is reported.
Table 3
Treatment Effects by Tax Professional Complying Status
Notes: Standard errors clustered by tax professional reported in parentheses; t-statistics in square brackets;
number of observations is reported below the standard error. Each coefficient is from a separate regression.
Columns show treatment effects on various outcomes -- cols. 1, 3, 4: change in EITC amount from year 1 to
year 2; col. 2: change in earnings from year 1 to year 2; col. 5: change in wage-based EITC amount (EITC
computed based solely on wage earnings) from year 1 to year 2; All regressions include the following base
year controls: earnings, earnings squared, wage earnings, married filing jointly dummy, and number of
qualifying children (1 vs. 2 or more). Col. 3 limits the sample to those with positive self-employment income in
year 1. Cols. 4 and 5 limit the sample to pure wage earners (no self-employment income in year 1).
Row (1) reports coefficients on the treatment indicator from OLS regressions of the form shown in equation (2)
in the text for the full sample of tax filers who returned in year 2. Row (2) limits the sample to complying tax
professionals, and row (3) limits the sample to non-complying tax professionals. A given tax filer i's tax
professional is defined as a "complier" if she has a higher fraction of other clients (excluding client i) with
middle income (between $7,000 and $15,400) in the treatment group than the control group. Row (4) reports
the difference in treatment effects between complying and non-complying tax professionals, which equals the
difference in coefficients between rows (2) and (3). In row (4), we regress each outcome variable on the
treatment indicator, an indicator for having a complying tax professional, and the interaction of the two
indicators. 
a) EITC Amount as a Function of Earnings
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b) Perceptions of EITC Schedule
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Figure 1: The Earned Income Tax Credit Schedule and Perceptions
NOTE: Panel A depicts the EITC amount as a function of annual earnings in 2007. The EITC amount varies
by marital status and number of qualifying children as shown. Panel B contrasts the actual EITC schedule for a
single tax ler with 2 or more children with our model of the perceived schedule based on existing survey evidence.
The perceived schedules are drawn for individuals with two levels of earnings, one in the phase-in and one in
the phase-out range. Each individual accurately perceives the level of his EITC refund, but underestimates the
extent to which variations in earnings aect the size of his EITC. If implemented as intended, the information
treatment should rotate the perceived EITC schedules (dashed lines) toward the actual EITC schedule (solid
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Figure 2: Time Spent Explaining the EITC to Clients Eligible for Treatment
NOTE: This gure is a histogram of the time spent (in seconds) by tax professionals on explaining the EITC to
clients eligible for the information treatment. Time spent was recorded by the tax preparation software. The
vertical line at 120 seconds depicts the threshold above which tax professionals received $5 of compensation (per
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Figure 3: Return Rates by Base-Year Income
NOTE: This gure plots the fraction of base year clients who returned to H&R Block to le their taxes in year
2. Each point represents the average return rate in a $1000 bin. The return rates are plotted separately for the
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0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Post−Treatment (Year 2) Earnings ($)
Control Treat EIC Amount
(b) 2+ Dependents
Figure 4: Year 2 Earnings Distributions: Full Sample
NOTE: These gures plot kernel densities of year 2 (post-treatment) income (sum of wage earnings and self-
employment income) for the full sample of individuals ling with a tax professional. The solid curve shows the
income distribution for the treatment group; the dashed curve shows the income distribution for the control
group. Panel A is for tax lers with 1 qualifying dependent for EITC purposes in the base year, while panel B
is for tax lers with 2 or more qualifying dependents. Each panel also shows the relevant EITC schedule (on
the left y-axis). The vertical lines mark the boundaries between the phase-in, peak, and phase-out ranges of the
EITC. Note that the EITC schedule shown in the Figure and all subsequent Figures is for single lers (91% of
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0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Post−Treatment (Year 2) Earnings ($)
Control Treatment EIC Amount
(b) 2+ Dependents
Figure 5: Year 2 Earnings Distributions: Self-Employed in Year 1
NOTE: These gures plot kernel densities of year 2 (post-treatment) income (sum of wage income and self-
employment income) for tax lers who had positive self-employment earnings in the base year. The solid curve
shows the income distribution for the treatment group; the dashed curve shows the income distribution for the
control group. Panel A is for the sample of individuals with one dependent, while panel B is for the sample of
individuals with two or more dependents. Each panel also shows the relevant EITC schedule for singles (on the
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0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Post−Treatment (Year 2) Earnings ($)
Control Treat EIC Amount
(b) 2+ Dependents
Figure 6: Year 2 Earnings Distributions: Complying Tax Professionals
NOTE: These gures plot kernel densities of year 2 (post-treatment) income (sum of wage earnings and self-
employment income) for the sample of individuals ling with a \complying" tax professional. A given tax ler
is tax professional is dened as a complier if she has a higher fraction of other clients (excluding client i) with
middle income (between $7,000 and $15,400) in the treatment group than the control group. The solid curve
shows the income distribution for the treatment group; the dashed curve shows the income distribution for the
control group. Panel A is for tax lers with 1 qualifying dependent for EITC purposes in the base year, while
panel B is for tax lers with 2 or more qualifying dependents. Each panel also shows the relevant EITC schedule
for singles (on the left y-axis). The vertical lines mark the boundaries between the phase-in, peak, and phase-out
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0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Post−Treatment (Year 2) Earnings ($)
Control Treat EIC Amount
(b) 2+ Dependents
Figure 7: Year 2 Earnings Distributions: Non-Complying Tax Professionals
NOTE: These gures plot kernel densities of year 2 (post-treatment) income (sum of wage earnings and self-
employment income) for the sample of individuals ling with a non-complying tax professional. A given tax
ler is tax professional is dened as a non-complier if she has a lower fraction of other clients (excluding client
i) with middle income (between $7,000 and $15,400) in the treatment group than the control group. The solid
curve shows the income distribution for the treatment group; the dashed curve shows the income distribution
for the control group. Panel A is for tax lers with 1 qualifying dependent for EITC purposes in the base year,
while panel B is for tax lers with 2 or more qualifying dependents. Each panel also shows the relevant EITC
schedule for singles (on the left y-axis). The vertical lines mark the boundaries between the phase-in, peak, and
phase-out ranges of the EITC.
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EITC Handout: 4 Step ExplanationA Online Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Compliers vs. Non-Compliers Estimator
This appendix proves that we would detect zero treatment eects within the group of clients
served by \complying" (or \non-complying") tax professionals if all tax professionals have zero
treatment eects. To begin, index tax professionals by p = 1;::;P and clients by i = 1;::;I.
Each tax professional p serves a set Ip of clients. For a client i served by tax professional p,
denote by Ip; i the set of other clients (excluding i) served by tax professional p. Let Ti = 0;1
denote the intent-to-treat status of client i. The set Ip; i is partitioned into two sets of clients:
those who were treated (Tj = 1) and those not treated (Tj = 0). Denote these two sets by
I1
p; i and by I0
p; i. Formally, for t = 0;1, It
p; i = fj 2 Ip; ijTj = tg. Denote by yi;p an outcome
such as earnings reported in year 2. Let mi;p denote an indicator for whether client i of tax
professional p has \middle income" (earnings between $7,000 and $15,400) in year 2.
For a given outcome y, there are two potential outcomes: y0
i;p if the client is in the control
group Ti = 0 and y1
i;p if the client is in the treatment group Ti = 1. We only observe y
Ti
i;p. For a









p; ij and Ci;p = 0 otherwise.
Denition 1 There are no treatment eects along outcome y i y1
i;p = y0
i;p for all (i;p).
Theorem 1 Suppose there are no treatment eects on outcomes y and m. Then
(1) C and y are independent variables.
(2) E[yipjC = 1;T = 1] = E[yipjC = 1;T = 0] and E[yipjC = 0;T = 1] = E[yipjC = 0;T =
0], i.e., the average outcome y is the same in expectation across treatment and control clients
within the sample of compliers and within the sample of non-compliers.
(3) E[yipjC = 1;T = 1] = E[yipjC = 0;T = 1] and E[yipjC = 1;T = 0] = E[yipjC = 0;T =
0], i.e., the average outcome y is the same in expectation across complying and non-complying
cases within the sample of treated clients and within the sample of non-treated clients.
Proof:
(1): Suppose there are no treatment eects on outcome m. Then m1
i;p = m0
i;p for all (i;p).























p; i depends solely on Tj for j 2 I0
p; i [ I1
p; i. Because treatment T is
randomly assigned, any outcome of individual i such as mi;p or yi;p must be independent of
Tj for j 6= i. Hence, outcomes mi;p or yi;p are also independent of I1
p; i and I0
p; i. Therefore
outcomes mi;p or yi;p are independent of Ci;p.
(2) Recognizing that y1
ip is independent of Ci;p, we have
E[yipjC = 1;T = 1] = E[y
1
ipjC = 1;T = 1] = E[y
1
ipjT = 1]
39We then have E[y1
ipjT = 1] = E[y1
ipjT = 0] because T is randomly assigned and E[y1
ipjT = 0] =
E[y0




ipjT = 0] = E[y
0
ipjC = 1;T = 0] = E[yipjC = 1;T = 0]:
The proof for the case of C = 0 is identical.
(3) This follows from the following set of equalities:
E[yipjC = 1;T = 1] = E[y
1





ipjC = 0;T = 1] = E[yipjC = 0;T = 1]
where we use the fact that C and yip are independent in the second and fourth equality. QED
A.2 Sensitivity Analysis: Denition of Compliance
In this section, we assess the robustness of the results in Section 5 to the denition of \com-
pliance." We focus on two key dependent variables: changes in EITC amounts and changes in
wage-based EITC amounts.
In Appendix Table A4, we use EITC amounts instead of the middle income indicator to
dene tax professional compliance. For each tax ler i, we dene his tax professional as a
complier if the average year 2 EITC amount of her other treated clients (excluding client i) is
higher than the average year 2 EITC amount of her other control clients. From the perspective
of client i, his tax professional is a complier under this denition if she uses the information
treatment to increase EITC amounts among her other clients. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
A4 report mean treatment eects for the change in the EITC amount (from year 1 to year 2).
Columns 3 and 4 report mean treatment eects for the change in the wage-based EITC amount.
Columns 1 and 3 do not include any controls, while columns 2 and 4 include the standard vector
of base year controls used above.
Row (1) of Table A4 replicates the results for the full sample. Row (2) considers individuals
served by tax professionals who are \compliers" based on the EITC amount denition. Clients
given the information treatment by these tax professionals increase their total EITC amounts
by about $64 more than control group clients of the same tax professionals. Approximately $55
of this increase in the EITC amount comes from changes in wage earnings. These estimates
are statistically signicant with p < 0:05.
Row (3) shows that clients given the information treatment by non-complying tax profes-
sionals experience reductions in their EITC amounts relative to their peers in the control group.
The treatment is estimated to reduce the wage-based EITC by $58 in the specication with
controls (column 4). These reductions in EITC amounts { driven largely by the wage-based
component { are consistent with our earlier ndings that non-compliers induce their treated
clients to increase their wage earnings. Finally, rows (4) and (5) conrm that there are sig-
nicant dierences in year 2 outcomes between clients treated by compliers and non-compliers,
40even after controlling for observed client heterogeneity. Overall, the results in Table A4 show
that the \middle income" and EITC-based denitions of compliance { two dierent ways of
quantifying changes in the concentration of the income distribution { generate treatment eects
with similar magnitudes.34
Thus far, we have divided tax professionals into two distinct categories { compliers and non-
compliers. We now explore the robustness of the results to the use of continuous measures of tax
professional compliance. For client i, dene the continuous compliance measure tpcompliancei
as the tax professional's treatment eect on a year 2 outcome excluding client i himself. For
instance, with the middle income outcome, tpcompliancei is the fraction of treated clients who
have middle income minus the fraction of control clients who have middle income, excluding
client i. Since each tax professional has only 15 treated and 15 control clients on average, there
are outliers in the tpcompliancei variable. For example, some tax professionals who have a
small number of clients happen to have 100% of their treated clients with middle income and
0% of their control clients with middle income, generating an extreme compliance measure of
100%. To reduce the inuence of these outliers, we drop observations that have tpcompliancei
below the 1st or above the 99th percentile of the tpcompliancei distribution.
Using the continuous tpcompliancei measure, we estimate variants of the interaction speci-
cations in row 4 of Table 3:
yi =  + 1treati + 2tpcompliancei + 3treati  tpcompliancei + "i. (A3)
The coecient of interest is 3, which measures how treatment eects vary with the degree of the
tax professional's compliance. Table A5 reports estimates of 3 for changes in EITC amounts
(row 1) and changes in wage-based EITC amounts (row 2). In column 1, tpcompliancei is
dened using the year 2 middle income indicator. In column 2, tpcompliancei is dened
using the year 2 EITC amount, providing a continuous analogue to the binary compliance
measure used in Table A4. The estimates in columns 1 and 2 show that more compliant
tax professionals generate larger increases in their treated clients' total and wage-based EITC
amounts. In interpreting the magnitudes of these coecients, it is useful to note that the
standard deviation of the continuous middle income compliance variable is 18% (after trimming
outliers). The corresponding standard deviation for the EITC amount compliance variable is
$600. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in the degree of compliance is estimated to
increase the treatment eect on the EITC amount by $31 for the middle income measure and
by $26 for the EITC amount measure of compliance. The considerable loss of precision in the
continuous specication relative to the binary specications appears to be driven by outliers.
Further trimming { e.g. removing or winsorizing the observations with values of tpcompliancei
below the 5th or above the 95th percentile { increases the precision of the estimates.
34We chose to use the middle income indicator in our baseline analysis because the estimates with the EITC
amount denitions of compliance are less precise, for two reasons. First, the substantial variance in EITC
amounts across clients creates noise in the compliance variable. Second, the \middle income" indicator more
directly identies increased bunching around the rst kink.
41In columns 3 and 4 of Table A5, we control for base year characteristics of clients when
dening the tpcompliancei measure. In these specications, tpcompliancei is eectively dened
based on the tax professional's eects on changes in behavior rather than levels of year 2
outcomes. We dene tpcompliancei by estimating a regression analogous to (2) using all clients
of client i's tax professional except client i himself. The regression includes the standard set
of base year controls: income, income squared, wage earnings, marital status, and dependents.
The tpcompliancei measure is the estimated treatment eect from this regression.
Column 3 reports estimates using the continuous version of the middle income outcome with
base year controls, and column 4 reports the same for the EITC outcome. These specications
include the base year controls and their interactions with the tpcompliancei variable. As
above, we trim outliers by dropping observations with the 1% largest and smallest values of
tpcompliancei. The estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in tpcompliancei
increases the treatment eect on the EITC amount by $21 for the middle income measure and
by $60 for the EITC amount measure of compliance. Although there is some variation in
the magnitude of the estimates with the continuous measures of compliance, the qualitative
pattern is robust: more compliant tax professionals induce larger treatment eects on total and
wage-based EITC amounts.
A.3 Calibration of Magnitudes
In this section, we benchmark the magnitudes of the information treatment eects relative
to the eects of conventional policy instruments such as an expansion of the EITC program or
changes in tax rates. We calibrate the changes in the behavior that would be caused by changes
in marginal incentives using estimates of the intensive margin labor supply elasticity from the
existing literature. As discussed in section 2, most studies nd insignicant eects of EITC
expansions on hours of work for those already in the work force. Our reading of the literature
suggests that an elasticity of e = 0:25 is an upper bound for the short-run intensive margin
elasticity of earnings (Chetty 2012). Since complying and non-complying tax professionals
generate qualitatively dierent behavioral responses, we present separate calibrations for each
case.
Complying tax professionals. Clients treated by complying tax professionals respond in a
manner consistent with what would be expected to occur when the EITC program is expanded.
We therefore calculate the percentage expansion in the EITC that would be required to produce
the same change in earnings behavior as the information treatment.
Let ti denote the EITC phase-in rate (ti = :4 for lers with two or more dependents and
ti = :34 for those with one dependent). Let td denote the phase-out rate (td = 0:21 for two or
more dependents, td = 0:16 for one dependent). Expanding the EITC program by  percent
would increase the net-of-tax rate from 1+ti to 1+ti(1+) in the phase-in range and decrease
the net-of-tax rate from 1   td to 1   td(1 + ) in the phase-out range. To calibrate how
these changes would aect earnings behavior, we use a specication of utility as a function of
42consumption (c) and labor (l) that produces a constant net-of-tax elasticity:






dlog1 t denotes the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
Note that there are no income eects with this quasi-linear utility specication, so labor supply
is a function purely of the marginal tax rate.
In the phase-in range, if the earnings level under the existing EITC program is z0, earnings
after the  percent EITC expansion would be
z
i
 = z0  [(1 + t
i(1 + ))=(1 + t
i)]
e ' z0 
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Symmetrically, in the phase-out range, if earnings under the existing EITC are equal to z0,
earnings after the  percent EITC expansion would be
z
d
 = z0  [(1   t
d(1 + ))=(1   t
d)]
e ' z0 
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To nd the  that generates responses comparable to those estimated in the data, we focus on
our estimate of the change in the EITC amount induced by the information treatment. For
complying tax professionals, we estimate that the information treatment increased the average
EITC amount by EITC = $58 (Table 3, column 1, row 2). To derive a comparable measure
for the eect of a  percent EITC expansion, we calculate the increase in the EITC amount
under the initial (pre-expansion) schedule, which is the relevant measure for comparisons of
behavioral responses. The change in earnings behavior in the phase-in range (zi
 z0) increases
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Likewise, in the phase-out range, the change in earnings (zd
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Let i and d denote the fraction of the EITC claimants in the phase-in and phase-out regions
respectively. Let  zi and  zd denote the average earnings in the phase-in and phase-out regions.
The mean eect of the EITC expansion on EITC amounts under the initial schedule is:
EITC '   e 


i   zi 
(ti)2
1 + ti + 





In our sample, i = :28, d = :53,  zi = $6;600,  zd = $23;300, ti = 0:37 (the average of
4340% and 34%), and td = 18:5% (the average of 21% and 16%). With EITC = $58 and
e = :25, solving equation (A4) yields  = 33%. That is, a 33% expansion in the federal EITC
would be required to generate the same labor supply responses along the intensive margin as
the information treatment implemented by complying tax professionals.
Non-complying tax professionals. The information treatment as implemented by non-
complying tax professionals led to a pure increase in earnings, which is consistent with a re-
duction in perceived tax rates rather than changes in perceptions of the EITC schedule. We
therefore calculate the percentage reduction in tax rates that would produce an increase in
earnings equal to the treatment eect estimate of $247 (Table 3, column 2, row 3).
The EITC claimants in our sample face an average marginal tax rate of approximately
t = 10% and have average earnings of z = $16;500. A reduction in t by t would generate a







With z = $247 and e = :25, solving equation (A5) yields t = 5:4%. That is, a 5.4 percentage
point reduction in marginal tax rates would be required to generate the same labor supply re-
sponses along the intensive margin as the information treatment implemented by non-complying
tax professionals.
44Distribution: Δ EITC Amount Δ Wage-Based 
EITC Amount
(1) (2)
(1) Full Sample  0.074 0.273
     [N = 30,303]
(2) Complying Tax Professionals 0.005 0.005
     [N = 15,395]
(3) Non-Complying Tax Professionals 0.045 0.010
     [N=14,534]
Table A1
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests of Treatment Effects on Distributions
Notes: This table reports p values from Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for
equality of various distributions across treated and control group clients. In column 1, the
variable considered is the change in EITC amount from year 1 to year 2; column 2: the
change in EITC amount computed based solely on wage earnings. The first row is for the
full sample. The second row considers clients served by "complying" tax professionals,
while the third row considers those served by "non-complying" tax professionals. A given tax
filer i's tax professional is defined as a "complier" if she has a higher fraction of other clients
(excluding client i) with middle income (between $7,000 and $15,400) in the treatment
group than the control group. 
The p values are computed using a permutation algorithm as follows. We generate a
placebo treatment randomly (50% probability) and recompute the KS test statistic based on
this placebo treatment. This exercise is repeated 2000 times to generate a distribution of
KS statistics. The p-values reported in the table are the percentile where the original KS
statistics (for the true treatment) fall within the empirical distribution of the 2000 placebo KS












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Income ($) 16,599 16,509 -89.86 16,541 16,731 189.80
(107.30) (114.12) (124.15) (111.62) (118.45) (129.83)
Wage Earnings ($) 15,868 15,808 -59.61 15,837 16,002 164.77
(136.53) (143.15) (141.82) (136.04) (135.41) (150.59)
EITC amount ($) 2,490 2,486 -3.23 2,470 2,446 -24.23
(16.12) (18.23) (18.45) (15.18) (16.59) (17.85)
Percent Self Employed 11.65% 11.34% -0.31% 11.26% 11.07% -0.20%
(0.71) (0.72) (0.46) (0.63) (0.52) (0.50)
Percent Low Income 14.07% 14.56% 0.49% 14.66% 14.88% 0.22%
(0.41) (0.44) (0.47) (0.42) (0.43) (0.53)
Percent Middle Income 34.68% 34.80% 0.13% 33.99% 33.14% -0.85%
(0.66) (0.73) (0.70) (0.62) (0.61) (0.69)
Percent Upper Income 51.26% 50.64% -0.62% 51.35% 51.98% 0.63%
(0.63) (0.69) (0.75) (0.63) (0.67) (0.76)
Percent Married 9.94% 8.97% -0.97% 9.08% 9.87% 0.80%
(0.46) (0.44) (0.40) (0.44) (0.45) (0.40)
Percent with 2 or more 59.24% 59.42% 0.18% 59.37% 59.39% 0.02%
dependents in Year 1 (0.54) (0.52) (0.67) (0.51) (0.59) (0.69)
Percent Return in Year 2 72.33% 72.04% -0.29% 72.87% 71.55% -1.32%
Percent with 2 or more (0.52) (0.54) (0.62) (0.52) (0.58) (0.68)
Table A2
Means of Base-Year Variables by Treatment Eligibility and Complying Tax Professional Status
A. Complying Tax Pros B. Non-Complying Tax Pros
Notes: All variables are base year (year 1) values except last row. Standard errors clustered by tax
professional reported in parentheses. Income is defined as the sum of wage income and self-employment
income. Self employed is a binary variable defined as having positive self-employment income
(irrespective of other wage earnings). Low income is defined as income below $7,000; middle income is
defined as income between $7,000 and $15,400; and upper income is defined as income above $15,400.
Treatment group includes all tax filers we intended to treat. Columns (1) to (3) include the sample of
clients served by complying tax professional while columns (4) to (6) include the sample of clients served
by a non-complying tax professional. A given tax filer i's tax professional is defined as a "complier" if she
has a higher fraction of other clients (excluding client i) with middle income (between $7,000 and $15,400)





amount Δ Earnings Δ Earnings Δ Earnings












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) Full Sample 9.47 10.23 22.72 -263.60 167.11 111.34
(28.15) (31.33) (17.34) (148.46) (181.29) (118.51)
7,442 5,687 17,174 7,442 5,687 17,174
(2) Complying Tax 42.45 48.31 66.53 -204.21 3.70 -221.10
  Professionals (40.78) (43.90) (24.30) (215.60) (257.54) (170.87)
3,773 2,962 8,660 3,773 2,962 8,660
(3) Non-Complying -30.13 -35.91 -31.39 -325.65 336.32 474.11
  Tax Professionals (42.63) (46.47) (25.14) (205.25) (267.55) (170.26)
3,596 2,656 8,282 3,596 2,656 8,282
(4) Compliers vs Non- 72.58 84.22 97.92 121.44 -332.62 -695.21
  Compliers: (2) - (3) (61.58) (65.12) (35.56) (298.90) (377.74) (248.92)
7,369 5,618 16,942 7,369 5,618 16,942
(5) Compliers vs Non- 68.86 86.71 97.22 121.76 -322.61 -690.70
  Compliers w/ Cntrls (61.47) (65.22) (35.56) (299.62) (378.00) (248.65)
  for Heterogeneity 7,369 5,618 16,942 7,369 5,618 16,942
Table A3
Treatment Effects by Tax Professional Complying Status and EITC Range
Notes: Standard errors clustered by tax professional reported in parentheses; number of observations is
reported below the standard error. Each coefficient is from a separate regression. Columns show
treatment effects on various outcomes -- cols. 1, 2, 3: change in EITC amount from year 1 to year 2;
cols. 4, 5, 6: change in earnings from year 1 to year 2. All regressions include the following base year
controls: earnings, earnings squared, wage earnings, married filing jointly dummy, and number of
qualifying children (1 vs. 2 or more). Cols. 1 and 4 limit the sample to those with earnings in the EITC
phase-in in year 1. Cols. 2 and 5 limit the sample to those with earnings in the EITC plateau in year 1.
Cols. 3 and 6 limit the sample to those with earnings in the EITC phase-out in year 1.
Row (1) reports coefficients on the treatment indicator from OLS regressions of the form shown in
equation (2) in the text for the full sample of tax filers who returned in year 2. Row (2) limits the sample to 
complying tax professionals, and row (3) limits the sample to non-complying tax professionals. See notes
to Table A1 for definition of complying tax professionals. Row (4) reports the difference in treatment
effects between complying and non-complying tax professionals, which equals the difference in
coefficients between rows (2) and (3). In row (4), we regress each outcome variable on the treatment
indicator, an indicator for having a complying tax professional, and the interaction of the two indicators.
The coefficient on the interaction is reported. We also include interactions of the base year control
variables with the complying tax professional indicator. Row (5) reports the difference in treatment
effects between complying and non-complying tax professionals controlling for heterogeneity in
treatment effects by client observables. This specification adds interactions of the base year controls
with the treatment indicator to the specifications in row (4). The coefficient on the treatment x complying
tax professional interaction is reported.Dependent Variable: Δ EITC Amt. Δ EITC Amt. Δ Wage Based Δ Wage Based
with controls EITC Amount EITC Amount
with controls
($) ($) ($) ($)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Full Sample 24.02 17.17 8.393 1.75
     [N=30,303] (14.77) (14.06) (15.57) (14.96)
[1.63] [1.22] [0.54] [0.12]
(2) Complying Tax Professionals 64.98 63.24 54.77 54.91
     [N=14,973] (24.91) (25.42) (24.86) (24.95)
[2.61] [2.49] [2.20] [2.20]
(3) Non-Complying Tax Professionals -22.97 -34.80 -44.81 -58.00
     [N=14,956] (24.89) (24.67) (25.27) (25.46)
[-0.92] [-1.41] [-1.77] [-2.28]
(4) Compliers vs. Non-Compliers: (2) - (3) 87.94 97.53 99.58 113.07
     [N=29,929] (40.93) (42.60) (40.32) (41.89)
[2.15] [2.29] [2.47] [2.70]
(5) Compliers vs. Non-Compliers 96.50 96.70 111.01 111.98
Controlling for Heterogeneity in (42.64) (42.67) (41.89) (41.90)
Treatment Effects by Client Observables [2.26] [2.27] [2.65] [2.67]
     [N=29,929]
Table A4
Notes: Standard errors clustered by tax professional reported in parentheses; t-statistics in square brackets. Each
coefficient is from a separate regression. A given tax filer i's tax professional is defined as a "complier" if her other
treated clients have higher average EITC amounts in year 2 than her other control clients (excluding client i). The
dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is the change in EITC amount from year 1 to year 2; in columns 3 and 4, it is
the change in the wage-based EITC amount (EITC computed based solely on wage earnings). Columns 2 and 4
include the following base year controls: earnings, earnings squared, wage earnings, marital status, and number of
children.
Row (1) reports the treatment effects in the full sample, row (2) restricts the sample to clients of complying tax
professionals, and row (3) to non-complying tax professionals. Row (4) reports the difference in treatment effects
between complying and non-complying tax professionals. Row (5) reports the difference in treatment effects
between complying and non-complying tax professionals, controlling for heterogeneity in treatment effects by base
year characteristics of clients.  See notes to Table 3 for details of regression specifications.
Compliance Defined By Treatment Effects on EITC AmountYear 2 variable for compliance def. Middle Income EITC Amount Middle Income EITC Amount
Base year controls in compliance def. No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) Δ EITC Amount ($) 173.92 0.044 127.94 0.101
(87.68) (0.029) (92.61) (0.038)
[1.98] [1.52] [1.38] [2.64]
[N=29,351] [N=29,362] [N=29,346] [N=29,353]
(2) Δ Wage-Based EITC Amount ($) 227.58 0.050 182.88 0.091
(88.04) (0.029) (91.47) (0.038)
[2.58] [1.72] [2.00] [2.42]
[N=29,351] [N=29,362] [N=29,346] [N= 29,353]
Table A5
Notes: Standard errors clustered by tax professional reported in parentheses; t-statistics in square brackets. This
table uses continuous measures of compliance instead of binary definitions. Each coefficient listed is from a separate
regression of the form shown in equation (3) in the text, which includes the treatment indicator, a continuous measure
of tax professional compliance, and the interaction of these two variables. Each column of the table reports the
coefficient on the interaction between different tax professional compliance variables and the treatment indicator. The
dependent variable is the change in EITC amount from year 1 to year 2 in row (1), and the change in the wage-based
EITC amount in row (2). In all columns, the complying tax professional variable is defined for each client by excluding
that client himself. In column 1, the complying tax professional variable is defined as a continuous variable equal to
the fraction of other clients treated in year 1 who have middle income in year 2 (between $7,000 and $15,400) minus
the fraction of other control clients in year 1 who have middle income in year 2. 
In column 2, the complying tax professional variable is defined as a continuous variable equal to the average EITC
amount in year 2 of other clients treated in year 1 minus the average EITC amount in year 2 of other clients in the
control group in year 1. Columns 3 and 4 replicate the definitions in 1 and 2, but define the continuous measure of
treatment effects on other clients using a regression that controls for the following base year observables: earnings,
earnings squared, wage earnings, marital status, and number of children. We also control for the same base year
variables and their interaction with the compliance variable when estimating the regressions in columns 3 and 4. 
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0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Post−Treatment (Year 2) Earnings ($)
Control Treatment EIC Amount
(b) 2+ Dependents
Figure A1: Year 2 Wage Earnings Distributions: Complying Tax Professionals
NOTE: These gures plot kernel densities of year 2 (post-treatment) of wage earnings for tax lers who led with
a complying tax professional. See notes to Figure 5 for the denition of complying tax professionals. The solid
curve shows the income distribution for the treatment group; the dashed curve shows the income distribution for
the control group. Panel A is for the sample of individuals with one dependent, while panel B is for the sample
of individuals with two or more dependents. Each panel also shows the relevant EITC schedule for singles (on
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0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000
Post−Treatment (Year 2) Earnings ($)
Control Treatment EIC Amount
(b) 2+ Dependents
Figure A2: Year 2 Wage Earnings Distributions: Non-Complying Tax Professionals
NOTE: These gures plot kernel densities of year 2 (post-treatment) wage earnings for tax lers who led with
a non-complying tax professional. See notes to Figure 6 for the denition of non-complying tax professionals.
The solid curve shows the income distribution for the treatment group; the dashed curve shows the income
distribution for the control group. Panel A is for the sample of individuals with one dependent, while panel B is
for the sample of individuals with two or more dependents. Each panel also shows the relevant EITC schedule
for singles (on the left y-axis). The vertical lines mark the boundaries between the phase-in, peak, and phase-out
ranges of the EITC.
51APPENDIX EXHIBIT I(a)
Information Treatment Screen #1 in H&R Block SoftwareAPPENDIX EXHIBIT I(b)
Information Treatment Screen #2 in H&R Block SoftwareDear
Your earnings this year (in 2007) determine the size of your EIC refund next year. The EIC has 3 ranges: 1)
Increasing, 2) Peak, 3) Decreasing.
The EIC (Earned Income Credit) gives tax refunds to working families.  We want to explain how the EIC
works to help you decide how much to work and earn this year. In 2006, you made $
you are getting an EIC of $ in your tax refund.
In 2007 if you earn
between:
Your EIC refund in
2008 will be: If you earn $10 more, the EIC:
$0-$11,790 $0 up to $4,716 Increases by $4
$11,790-$17,390 $4,716 Stays the same





Note: The EIC does not affect any other credits or refunds you can get. This table applies to married joint filers with two or more qualifying children. If
your family situation changes in 2007, your EIC may also change (see IRS Publication 596). Changes in earnings may also affect other credits you are
entitled to or taxes you may owe.  Though the printed earnings and EIC amounts are based directly on your current tax return, the indication of your




You are in the ** increasing ** range of the EIC.  Think about it like this: Suppose you 




Printout Given to Tax Filer[Date]





Thank you for preparing your taxes with H&R Block this year. Even though it’s early, we want to provide important 
information that you may want to consider as you plan ﬁnancially for next year. The EIC (Earned Income Credit) gives 
tax credits to working families. This year, you qualiﬁed for the EIC. This letter is a follow up to the EIC information 
your H&R Block tax professional shared with you when you had your taxes prepared. We want to remind you how the 
EIC works as you consider how much to work and earn this year.





































































































































Last year, you were in the increasing range of the EIC. 
Look at the table below. Will you be in the increasing 
range again this year? If yes, think about it like this: 
Suppose you earn $10 an hour. Because of the EIC, for 
each $10 you earn you could be eligible to receive an 
additional $4 in EIC – so it’s like you’re making $14 an 
hour. It pays to work more!
This table applies to single ﬁlers with two or more qualifying children. If your family situation changes in 2007, 
your EIC may also change (see IRS Publication 596). Many things can affect EIC, including changes in your family 
situation, other ﬁnancial changes, or changes in tax laws. These changes may also affect your eligibility for other 
credits or deductions or taxes you may owe.
We hope you ﬁnd the EIC information helpful. We look forward to continuing to provide tax and ﬁnancial planning 
assistance to you in the future.
Sincerely,
Bernard M. Wilson 
Vice President 
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT III





Dear Tax Professional, 
 
As you know and thanks to your help, H&R Block has implemented an EIC outreach effort in 
Chicago where you have explained the Earned Income Tax Credit to our clients. In order to evaluate 
this initiative, we would like to ask you a few short questions about your experience.  Please circle 
your response to each question below. 
 
1) What proportion of your clients was interested in the EIC information?   
 
a. Few (less than 25% of your clients) 
   
b. Many (25% to 75% of your clients)       
 
c. Most (over 75% of your clients) 
 






3) Is there anything else you would want to tell us about this EIC outreach or about how to make it 
















Please return this survey to your office leader who will forward it to Block headquarters in the 
envelope provided to each office.  Thank you for your participation in the EIC Outreach and in 
this survey. 
If you have questions, please contact Eileen McCarthy, at 816.854.4866. 
APPENDIX EXHIBIT IV